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I.  INTRODUCTION: LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AS AN ISSUE OF ACADEMIC 
STUDY AND INTERNATIONAL POLICY 
The study of labor law enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean 
has become increasingly important among academic researchers1 not 
insignificantly because many of the region’s countries have free trade 
agreements (FTA) with the United States that incorporate a labor clause, or 
“side agreement” in the case of the North America Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), calling for each party to enforce its national labor laws, broadly 
defined to include both collective and individual rights.2  FTAs, except 
NAFTA, include further commitments in favor of promoting internationally 
 
 1. See, e.g., Vera Jatobá, INT’L. LAB. OFFICE, NO. 148 INSPECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO EN EL 
MARCO DE LA MODERNIZACIÓN DE LA ADMINISTRACIÓN DEL TRABAJO: SERIE CONFERENCIA 
INTERAMERICANA DE MINISTROS DEL TRABAJO 3, 6 (2002); Michael Piore & Andrew Schrank, 
Toward a Managed Flexibility: The Revival of Labour Inspection in the Latin World, 147 INT’L 
LAB. REV. 1, 23–25 (2008) [hereinafter Piore & Schrank]; Roberto Pires, Promoting Sustainable 
Compliance: Styles of Labour Inspection and Compliance Outcomes in Brazil, 147 INT’L LAB. 
REV. 199, 199–201 (2008); Andrew Schrank, Professionalization and Probity in the Patrimonial 
State: Labor Inspectors in the Dominican Republic, 51 LATIN AM. POL. & SOC’Y. 91, 91 (2009) 
[hereinafter Schrank, Professionalism and Probity]; ANDREW SCHRANK & MICHAEL PIORE, 
ECLAC/MEXICO, SERIE ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS: NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR 
STANDARDS IN CENTRAL AMERICA at 43–47, U.N. DOC. 77, U.N. Sales No. E.07.II.G.44 (2007) 
(calling for increased labor inspection) available at http://www.cepal.org/publicaciones/xml/3/ 
28113/Serie%2077.pdf. 
 2. MARY JANE BOLLE, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, NAFTA LABOR SIDE AGREEMENT: 
LESSONS FOR THE WORKER RIGHTS AND FAST-TRACK DEBATES (2002), available at  
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/8118.pdf. 
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recognized core labor rights.3  The stress on national enforcement in all of 
these FTAs, although criticized by some labor activists for being inadequate 
and ineffective, has spurred modest but important institutional modernization 
of some of the region’s labor law enforcement bodies with some improvements 
in the enforcement of the labor laws.4 
Chile is one of the countries with an FTA with the United States that 
contains a labor clause calling for each party to respect core labor rights as 
well as its national labor laws.5  The U.S.-Chile FTA establishes that when 
matters arise regarding the parties’ commitment to enforcing their national 
labor laws, the parties may request cooperative consultations to resolve the 
matter.6  If such consultations do not resolve the dispute, then the parties may 
resort to arbitration7 and sanctions.8 
Today, Chile is effectively in violation of the labor clause of the U.S.-Chile 
FTA for failing to enforce its 2006 Subcontracting Law (or “anti-
subcontracting law”).9  In 2008, the Chilean Supreme Court effectively 
rendered unconstitutional Chile’s Dirección del Trabajo, or Labor Directorate’s 
(hereinafter referred to by its Spanish acronym, “DT”) administrative 
enforcement of the subcontracting law by holding that the DT acted as a so-
called illegal “special commission” when it administratively adjudicated 
matters related to “contractual controversies” arising from its enforcement of 
the anti-subcontracting law.10  The DT is the sole administrative agency in 
charge of enforcing all of the country’s labor laws.  Thus, absent constitutional 
reform in Chile enabling the DT to adjudicate contractual controversies 
without being regarded as an illegal “special commission,” which seems highly 
unlikely in the near future, or packing the courts with liberal judges, 
enforcement of some labor laws, such as the anti-subcontracting law, will have 
to be achieved through the courts rather than through administrative activity.11  
 
 3. U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement, art. 18.1, (2004), available at http://www.ustr.gov/ 
sites/default/files/uploads/agreements/fta/chile/asset_upload_file535_3989.pdf [hereinafter U.S.-
Chile FTA]. 
 4. See Schrank, Professionalism and Probity, supra note 1, at 91–92; Piore & Schrank, 
supra note 1, at 1. 
 5. U.S.-Chile FTA, Art. 22.6. 
 6. Id. arts. 18.6, 22.4, 22.5; see also id., Annex 18.5. 
 7. Id. art. 22.6. 
 8. Id. art. 22.16. 
 9. Cód. Trab., Title VII (Chile) (codifying Chile Law No.20.123) (Sp.). 
 10. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. Nos. 877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-
2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008.  The Codelco cases have 
not been the only ones where the Supreme Court of Chile has determined that the DT acted as an 
illegal “special commission.”  See José Luis Ugarte Cataldo, Inspección del trabajo en Chile: 
vicisitudes y desafíos, 6 REVISTA LATINO AMERICANA DE DERECHO SOCIAL 187, 188 (2008). 
 11. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., DEP’T OF LAB., NO. 2738, LABOR RIGHTS REPORT: CHILE 
6 (2003), available at http://www.dol.gov/ilab/media/reports/usfta/hr2738chilelaborrights.pdf. 
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Since no procedural avenues exist for workers to make group claims before the 
courts—such as those that arise from most of the subcontracting cases—
judicial avenues for enforcing labor laws affecting group rights, such as the 
anti-subcontracting law, are inadequate.  This procedural inadequacy renders 
the anti-subcontracting law effectively unenforceable and puts Chile in 
violation of the U.S.-Chile FTA. 
This paper first discusses the challenges that Chile faces in labor law 
enforcement.  Having higher-quality state institutions than most of its Latin 
American and Caribbean cousins, Chile faces a different set of challenges 
when it comes to labor law enforcement: its appellate courts’ and Supreme 
Court’s zealous protections of their jurisdiction, private property rights, and 
concomitant distrust of administrative activity and regulation, particularly in 
the key area of subcontracting.12  The paper then details Chilean labor law, 
explains how the country is not enforcing its important subcontracting statute, 
and explains how the United States, through the U.S.-Chile FTA, can play a 
useful role in promoting institutional reforms to effectively enforce labor laws 
in Chile. 
II.  LABOR LAW ENFORCEMENT IN CHILE 
Prior to the military coup of 1973, Chile was a country of strong unions 
and active state intervention in social affairs.13  Pinochet’s military 
dictatorship, installed through violence in 1973, banned unions, sharply 
curtailed social rights, including the rights of labor, and promoted a laissez 
faire, free-market political project which spurred neoliberalism in Latin 
America.14  In 1979, the dictatorship relaxed some of its most radical measures 
and lifted the ban on collective bargaining, but only at the enterprise level.15  
Industrial level or multiemployer bargaining was not protected by law.16  Since 
then, unions and sectors of the Chilean left have advocated for the 
reestablishment of multiemployer bargaining.  The center-left governments of 
the Concertación de Partidos por la Democracia (“Concertación”) that ruled 
the country from 1991–2010, however, did not amass the required internal 
consensus or political capital—or perhaps political will—to do so.17 
 
 12. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 192. 
 13. RICHARD SANDBROOK ET AL., SOCIAL DEMOCRACY IN THE GLOBAL PERIPHERY: 
ORIGINS, CHALLENGES, PROSPECTS 149–50 (2007); BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB, supra note 11, at 1–
2. 
 14. SANDBROOK ET AL., supra note 13, at 159–60; BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB, supra note 11, at 
1–2. 
 15. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 2. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Guillermo Campero, La Economía Política de las Relaciones Laborales 1990–2006, in 
37 SERIE ESTUDIOS SOCIO ECONÓMICOS 28–30 (2007), available at http://www.cieplan.org/ 
inicio/codigo.php?documento=cieplan%2037.pdf; Volker Frank, Politics Without Policy, in 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2010] OF LABOR INSPECTORS AND JUDGES 501 
Despite the lack of progress that labor unions and others on the left desired 
after the restoration of democracy in Chile, particularly on the restoration of 
multiemployer collective bargaining, the Concertación administrations clearly 
reformed the labor laws.18  Among other reforms, they reestablished just cause 
dismissal, adjusted minimum wages to inflation, placed new restrictions on 
employer lockouts, and strengthened public institutions to better enforce the 
labor laws.19 
A. The Labor Directorate 
The Decreto con Fuerza de Ley No. 2 of 1967 (DFL No. 2), enacted during 
the centrist, Christian Democratic Presidency of Eduardo Frei Montalva, is the 
organic law of the DT.  The law intends to provide an “agile and capable” 
agency to “conveniently realize” the “technical and fiscal” tasks for labor 
regulation in the country.20  It was enacted to provide for the “adequate 
economic and social development of the country,” to “scrutinize the correct 
application of the laws that guarantee the social rights of workers,” to 
implement the labor laws, and to “aid the government in developing the 
country’s social policy.”21  In this manner, the DT was created as an integrated, 
labor law enforcement agency where one agency enforces all or most of the 
country’s labor laws as is commonplace in Franco-Hispanic jurisdictions.22 
As Professor José Luis Ugarte Cataldo has described, the DT has an array 
of functions: policing, administrative interpretation of the law, conciliation and 
 
VICTIMS OF THE CHILEAN MIRACLE: WORKERS AND NEOLIBERALISM IN THE PINOCHET ERA, 
1973–2002, at 70 (Peter Winn ed.) (Duke 2004) (2006).  However, note that there has never been 
an overall attempt to revamp the entire Plan Laboral since the return of democracy in Chile.  
Rather, reform has been attempted in a piecemeal fashion (I thank Professor José Luis Ugarte for 
identifying this point). 
 18. See generally Campero, supra note 17, at 28–30.  For a more critical view of post-
Pinochet attempts to reform labor institutions, see generally Frank, supra note 17, at 70. 
 19. See generally Campero, supra note 17, at 16–23 (detailing the changes in Chilean labor 
law in 1991 and the affects of those changes) (internal citations omitted). 
 20. DECRETO CON FUERZA DE LEY NO. 2, Preamble (Chile) [hereinafter DFL No.2]. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Cód. Trab. art. 505 (Chile), available at http.//www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles-
59096_recurso_2.pdf.  In France, Spain, and most of those European countries’ former colonies, 
labor laws are enforced by one “generalist” government agency, rather than by an array of 
“specialist” agencies, as in the United States.  Moreover, rather than taking a principally punitive 
orientation to enforcement, Franco-Hispanic systems attempt to “educate” employers about how 
to implement labor laws and regulations through dissemination of best practices, labor laws, and 
regulations, among other information, before imposing sanctions on employers.  Therefore, in 
contrast to the “specialist’ and “punitive” Anglo-American model of labor law inspection, 
Franco-Hispanic labor law enforcement systems are characterized by their integrated or generalist 
quality and pedagogic orientation to law enforcement.  Michael J. Piore & Andrew Schrank, 
Trading Up, BOSTON REV., Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 11, available at http://bostonreview.net/BR31.5/ 
pioreschrank.php. 
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mediation, filing formal complaints in the courts, providing a public registry 
(“registro”) of temporary employment agencies (“temp agencies”), and 
attesting documents (“fe pública”).23  I would add a fledgling seventh function 
to Professor Ugarte Cataldo’s categories of the DT: a “pedagogical” one 
similar to that undertaken by other Franco-Hispanic labor law enforcement 
bodies, which aims to educate employers on how to comply with the law.  I 
discuss these functions below, although not necessarily in the order listed 
above. 
1. Policing 
The policing function is performed by the country’s labor inspectors 
employed by the DT, who can visit workplaces at any time, either de oficio—
without a preceding charge having been made by an employee against the 
employer—or after receiving a charge.24  Inspectors can inspect the physical 
premises and business records of employers at any time of the day or night.25  
Persons who interfere with the inspectors’ duties can be fined.26  Employers 
could be held directly and personally liable for such interferences, as well as 
for any moral, physical, and material damages suffered by inspectors while 
performing their duties.27  Inspectors can also summon public law enforcement 
officials, including the carabineros, Chile’s respected national police, for 
assistance.28 
Once inspectors find that an employer committed a violation of a labor 
law, they can fine the employer, order the suspension of work activities, and 
even close a workplace if there is an immediate hazard to the life and health of 
employees, or if employers are otherwise violating the labor laws.29 
The focus on fines and other coercive measures makes labor inspection 
particularly punitive in Chile, which is at odds with the more traditional 
Franco-Hispanic systems of labor inspection that are generally pedagogically 
oriented.30  As detailed below, the punitive orientation has been softened 
somewhat with the introduction of some pedagogic inspections, which include 
the substitution of fines for training and compliance assistance programs for 
unionized employers.  These programs, however, are still limited in scope.31 
 
 23. Ugarte Catado supra note 10, at 193–96. 
 24. DFL No.2, art. 27. 
 25. Id. art. 25. 
 26. DFL No.2, art. 25. 
 27. Id. art. 25. 
 28. Id. art. 26. 
 29. Id. arts. 28, 31, 34, and 38. 
 30. See Piore & Shrank, Trading Up, supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
 31. See infra Part II.A.2. 
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2. Pedagogical Inspections 
Notwithstanding its primary punitive orientation, the DT has used more 
than mere fines to compel employer compliance with the country’s labor laws.  
Until the late 1990s, the DT issued “actas de instrucción” (writs of 
instruction), whereby inspectors noted employer infractions and gave the 
employer fifteen days to comply with the law before issuing a fine.32  These 
writs of instruction had a quasi-pedagogical element to them, as employers 
could avoid a fine by proving that they remedied the infraction and complied 
with the law within that fifteen-day period.33 
By the late 1990s, however, the DT discontinued writs of instruction and 
installed more formalized programs including the compliance assistance 
inspection policy34 and the “training-for-fines program.”35  The compliance 
assistance program is limited to unionized employers, who are a small minority 
of employers in Chile, and is administered by a small but highly professional 
service within the national office of the DT.36  The training-for-fines program 
provides that small employers with nine employees or fewer can request 
assistance implementing the labor laws in lieu of fines levied by a labor 
inspector.37 
The training-for-fines program also provides medium-sized employers, 
with twenty-five employees or fewer, an alternative to the fine.  This 
alternative is available only for violations of an occupational health and safety 
rule if the employer requests the removal of a fine after issued by the DT.38  
Rather than merely attending a course, mid-size employers, with ten to twenty-
five employees must institute a program of voluntary compliance with the law 
that they violated in lieu of the fine.39 
The training-for-fines program has been regarded as a successful program 
in Chile by authorities such as the ILO.40  It contains the elements of the 
 
 32. Interview with María Ester Feres, Director of Chile’s Labor Directorate from 1994–2004 
(May 13, 2008) (on file with author); see also Heleen F.P. Ietswaart, Labor Relations Litigation: 
Chile, 1970–1972, 16 L. & SOC’Y. REV. 625, 642–45 (1981–82) (describing a historical account 
of the informal administrative practice). 
 33. Interview with María Ester Feres, supra note 32. 
 34. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, 3 ORDEN DE SERVICO (May 14, 2004) (Chile), available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-65345_OS_3.pdf. 
 35. CÓD. TRAB art. 506 (Chile), available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/legislacion/1611/articles-
59096_recurso_2.pdf [hereinafter CÓD. TRAB art. 506]. 
 36. César F. Rosado Marzán, ethnographic fieldnotes of June 4, 2009 (on file with author). 
 37. CÓD. TRAB art. 506. 
 38. Id. art. 506. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Schrank & Piore, NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOUR STANDARDS IN CENTRAL 
AMERICA, supra note 1, at 15 n.3. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
504 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 54:497 
traditional assistance-for-compliance aspects of the Franco-Hispanic systems.41  
The training-for-fines programs, however, remain limited only to smaller 
employers.42 
3. Administrative Interpretation of the Law 
The DFL No. 2 provides that the Director of the DT can determine the 
meaning and scope of labor legislation in the country43 so that its career 
servants can uniformly implement the law across the different regions of the 
country.44  This type of administrative interpretation of the law is 
accomplished in Chile through a procedure known as dictamen—an opinion or 
report issued by the director of a specific administrative agency.45  A dictamen 
directly binds all the officers of the administrative agency.46  It also indirectly 
binds private parties regulated by the law, as they must adapt their behavior to 
the dictamen if they want to reduce their chances of being fined or otherwise 
penalized by the government agency.47 
4. Conciliation and Mediation 
The DT, through its inspectors, also has the authority to summon parties 
and documents to resolve disputes between individual employees and 
employers.48  The inspectorate can fine any party that fails to appear without 
just cause after being summoned.49  The DT has used these powers to resolve 
alleged labor law violations before formally issuing sanctions50 or to settle 
matters extra-judicially.51  As more fully explained below, conciliation at the 
DT has recently become mandatory for some categories of wage and salary 
cases.52 
 
 41. Id. at 10. 
 42. See CÓD. TRAB art. 506. 
 43. DFL NO.2, art. 1. 
 44. E-mail communication with Sergio Mejía Viedma, Partner, Arthur, Hinzpeter, Pizarro, 
Huméres & Cía; Former Sub-Director, DT (1994–2000) (Mar. 5, 2008) (on file with author). 
 45. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 191.  Other Chilean administrative agencies with 
similar interpretative functions include the Controlaría General de la República (comptroller), 
Servicios de Impuestos Internos (treasury), Servicio Nacional de Aduanas (customs), and 
Superintendencia de Bancos e Instituciones Financieras (financial regulatory agency), among 
others.  Id. at 191 n.4. 
 46. Id. at 192. 
 47. Id. at 192 n.6 (internal citations omitted). 
 48. DFL NO.2 art. 29. 
 49. Id. art. 30. 
 50. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194. 
 51. See Antonio de la Jara, BPH Wants Chile Mediation on Spence Strike, REUTERS, Oct. 1, 
2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/idusn0141049420091001. 
 52. Infra Part III.A.  Note, the practice historically has been that most employees conciliate 
their charge against employers at the DT because the DT is seen as more responsive to workers 
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Finally, as with French labor inspectors, the Chilean labor inspectorate at 
the DT can also mediate collective bargaining disputes.53  If a union declares a 
strike, the union or the employer can request that the DT mediate the conflict.54  
The strike is suspended until the mediation process is exhausted.55 
5. Filing Complaints 
Notwithstanding its authority to generally administer and enforce all labor 
laws in Chile, the DT does not have authority to adjudicate all matters, and 
sometimes must file a complaint in the labor courts when it determines a 
violation of the law has occurred.  These violations include “anti-union” and 
disloyal practices by unions,56 and violations of “fundamental rights.”57  Anti-
union activities and disloyal practices in Chile resemble what in the United 
States we call “unfair labor practices.”  These practices include discrimination 
against employees who belong to a union, not providing information required 
for collective bargaining, and interfering in the internal matters of the union, 
among other actions.58  Employees may also commit similar illegal acts called 
“disloyal” actions against employers, which the DT should also refer to the 
courts.59  “Fundamental rights” include the right to life and physical integrity, 
the right to private communications, the right to honor, conscience and 
religion, free speech, freedom to enter into employment contracts, and freedom 
from sexual harassment.60 
6. Registry of Temporary Employment Agencies 
Under the new anti-subcontracting law, which is further detailed below, 
agents that provide temporary employees to principals that will be under the 
control of the principal—“empresas de servicios transitorios” or “enterprises 
 
claims than the more conservative courts of justice.  See Ietswaart, supra note 32, at 642–46, 648.  
After a recent labor justice reform, most wage claims will now be first conciliated at the DT 
before being heard by the labor judge in response to this known fact that conciliations tend to be 
very effective in resolving wage cases.  Infra Part III.A. 
 53. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194.  For the role of French labor inspectors in 
mediating labor disputes see generally Donald Reid, Putting Social Reform into Practice: Labor 
Inspectors in France, 1892–1914, 20 J. OF SOC. HIST. 67 (1986); Donald Reid, ‘Les Jeunes 
Inspecteurs’: Ideology and Activism Among Labour Inspectors in France After May 1968, 8 
FRENCH HIST. 296 (1994). 
 54. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194. 
 55. Id. 
 56. CÓD. TRAB art. 292. 
 57. Id. art. 485–86; see also Ugarte Cataldo supra note 10, at 194–95. 
 58. Id. art. 289. 
 59. CÓD. TRAB, art. 290. 
 60. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 194–95; CÓD. TRAB. art. 485; CONST. CHILE, art. 19. 
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of temporary services” (“temp agencies”)—must register with the DT.61  If the 
DT cancels their registration that temp agency becomes, for all practical 
effects, “extinct” and cannot transact business.62 
7. Attesting Documents 
Finally, the DT, through its inspectors, also acts as a ministro de fe, or a 
sort of official witness.63  As ministros de fe, factual determinations contained 
in the labor inspectors’ official documents can be used as evidence in court, 
and their contents are presumed to be true unless proven otherwise.64  This 
function is especially useful in those cases where the courts serve as the 
ultimate adjudicator of a complaint under the labor law. 
8. Labor Inspections After Pinochet 
The Chilean government has done an outstanding job reviving the DT after 
Pinochet’s rule left the institution in tatters.65  As Table 1 shows, the number of 
labor inspections increased from 26,868 to 53,973 during 1993, more than 
doubling three years after democracy was restored.66  Today labor inspections 
total more than 100,000 inspections per year.  As Table 2 shows, while in 
1990, only about 8% of all inspections were performed de oficio—or 
unsolicited—the number increased dramatically in 1992 to 23%.67  De oficio 
inspections peaked in 1996, amounting to more than 50% of all inspections.68  
Since then, the percent of all inspections that have been performed de oficio 
has oscillated between 51% and 32%, with the exception of 2002, when only 
13% of all inspections were made de oficio.69 
 
 61. El Funcionamiento de las Empresas de Servicios Transorios de Servicios y el Contrato 
de Trabajo de Servicios Transitorios, Law No.20.123, in BOLETIN OFICIAL DE LA DIRECCION 
DEL TRABAJO (November 2006); Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 195. 
 62. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 195. 
 63. DFL NO.2, art. 23. 
 64. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 196. 
 65. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 1–2. 
 66. Dirección del Trabajo, SERIES ESTADÍSTICAS 1990–2008, CAP. IV. ACTIVIDAD 
INSPECTIVA 4, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/documentacion/1612/w3-article-95234.html. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
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 Table 1: Number of Labor Inspections, 1990–2008 
  No. of 
 Year Inspections 
 1990 26,868 
 1991 30,936 
 1992 41,218 
 1993 53,973 
 1994 54,359 
 1995 65,090 
 1996 76,084 
 1997 76,943 
 1998 79,327 
 1999 87,545 
 2000 95,255 
 2001 101,259 
 2002 74,255 
 2003 97,947 
 2004 94,981 
 2005 114,937 
 2006 131,891 
 2007 139,108 
 2008 118,434 
  
 Source:  Adapted from Dirección del Trabajo, Series Estadícas 
Cap. IV Actividad Inspectiva 
 
 
 Table 2: De Oficio Inspections 1990–2008 
  No. of As a % 
  De Oficio of all 
 Year Inspections Inspections 
 
 1990 2179 8% 
 1991 2353 8% 
 1992 9378 23% 
 1993 19,729 37% 
 1994 22,044 41% 
 1995 30,779 47% 
 1996 39,217 52% 
 1997 39,024 51% 
 1998 38,044 48% 
 1999 42,601 49% 
 2000 39,225 41% 
 2001 34,302 34% 
 2002 9647 13% 
 2003 36,348 37% 
 2004 33,627 35% 
 2005 37,276 32% 
 2006 53,543 41% 
 2007 59,800 43% 
 2008 37,593 32% 
 
 Source: Adapted from Dirección del Trabajo, Series Estadícas Cap. 
IV Actividad Inspectiva 
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Fig. 1: Labor Inspectors in Latin America
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from ANDREW SCHRANK AND MICHAEL PIORE, ECLAC/MEXICO, SERIE 
ESTUDIOS Y PERSPECTIVAS NO. 77, NORMS, REGULATIONS AND LABOR STANDARDS IN 
CENTRAL AMERICA 22 (2007).  Years vary (Argentina 1999; Brazil 2005; Chile 2005; 
Dominican Republic 2005; Ecuador 2006; Guatemala 2004; Honduras 2005; Mexico 2002; 
Nicaragua 2005; Panama 2006, Paraguay 2005; Peru 2003; Uruguay 2006). 
 
In 1999, Chile signed ILO Convention No. 87 (on freedom of association, 
protecting the right to organize) and Convention No. 98 (on the right to 
organize and bargain collectively).70  After a period of military dictatorship 
and repression of labor leaders, activists, and ordinary workers, the ratification 
of the ILO conventions signaled Chile’s commitment to respect workers’ right 
to organize.71  In 2000, Chile also ratified ILO Convention No. 182 concerning 
child labor.72  At about that time, Chile also doubled the size of its labor 
inspectorate73 to attain the largest labor inspector per citizen in Latin 
America.74  The country now boasts about nineteen inspectors per every 
100,000 employed persons,75 a figure significantly higher than the rest of the 
 
 70. BUREAU OF INT’L. LAB. AFF., supra note 11, at 6. 
 71. Id. at 1, 3. 
 72. Id. at 3. 
 73. Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 3. 
 74. According to María Ester Feres, the Director of the DT from 1994 to 2004, she left the 
DT with more than 2000 functionaries, a huge improvement over the tattered, eighty-person body 
that remained when Pinochet gave up the reins of power in 1990.  Interview with María Ester 
Feres, supra note 32. 
 75. See Piore & Schrank, supra note 2, at 22.  Although the Chilean DT and other labor 
inspection experts claim the Chilean DT is among the most active in Latin America, through my 
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region.  As Figure 1 shows, the country with the highest per capita number of 
inspectors after Chile is Guatemala, with 7.53 inspectors per every 100,000 
workers, followed by Uruguay with 5.79 inspectors per every 100,000 workers 
and Panama with 5.6 inspectors per every 100,000 workers.76 
Finally, we should note that Chile increased its commitment to enforce 
core labor rights and its own labor laws when it signed the U.S-Chile FTA, 
which took effect on January 1, 2004.77  Since the early 1990s, when NAFTA 
was negotiated between the United States, Canada, and Mexico, the United 
States has been negotiating FTAs with labor clauses, a “side agreement” under 
NAFTA where each party promises to enforce its own labor laws so as to not 
use non-enforcement as an instrument of unfair trade.78  The United States and 
its trade partners attempt to enforce the parties’ obligations under the FTA’s 
labor clauses through bilateral “consultations.”79  There is no enforcement 
mechanism under the current FTAs to enforce core labor rights.80  
Consultations are geared to find solutions to any disputes regarding possible 
violations of the labor clauses, and, if such consultations fail, parties can seek 
mediation, arbitration, and/or request monetary sanctions against the adverse 
party.81 
B. The Labor Courts 
Courts in Chile have exclusive jurisdiction over several categories of 
labor-law-related claims, including nonpayment of wages and other 
remunerations, unfair dismissal cases and unfair labor practices.82  Jurisdiction 
of ordinary labor law complaints is exercised in Chile in the first instance by 
 
fieldwork in Chile’s DT it has come to my attention that the 19/100,000 labor inspector figure 
may be inflated due to the fact that the DT considers most of its rank-and-file officers 
“fiscalizadores,” or labor inspectors, even if these are mostly doing clerical work at one of the DT 
offices. 
 76. See Piore & Schrank, supra note 1, at 22. 
 77. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO-DIVISIÓN DE ESTUDIOS, 32 CUADERNOS DE INVESTIGACIÓN: 
LOS DERECHOS LABORALES DEL TRATADO DE LIBRE COMERCIO CHILE-ESTADO UNIDOS EN LA 
INDUSTRIA FORESTAL Y EN LA INDUSTRIA DEL SALMÓN 9 (2007). 
 78. See BOB HEPPLE, LABOUR LAW AND GLOBAL TRADE 107–09 (2005). 
 79. U.S.-Chile FTA, art. 22.4. 
 80. See generally, U.S.-Chile FTA. 
 81. U.S.-Chile FTA, arts. 18.5, 18.6, 22.4, 22.5, 22.6, 22.16, and Annex 18.5.  Note, under 
NAFTA/NAALC, private parties can also file “submissions”—a kind of complaint—in a 
National Administrative Office (“NAO”) of labor law violations of the NAALC against the U.S., 
Canada, or Mexico. There are three NAOs, one in each NAFTA/NAALC signatory country.  A 
party must file a submission in a NAO that is not located in the country being complained of in 
the submission.  If the NAO accepts the submission, and finds a violation, it may recommend 
consultations between the signing members of NAFTA/NAALC to resolve the alleged violations.  
HEPPLE supra note 78, at 110. 
 82. CÓD. TRAB., art. 420. 
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the labor courts.83  Labor court decisions can be appealed in the court of 
appeals and thereafter in the Supreme Court.84 
Labor courts can also review the actions of the DT through ordinary appeal 
procedures.85  In addition, courts of appeals may review the DT’s action 
through a special injunctive procedure called “recurso de protección,” or 
protection procedure.86  Protection procedures are available only to those 
plaintiffs who allege a violation of their constitutional rights under Article 19 
of Chile’s political constitution.87  Hence, while labor inspectors have the 
authority to assess violations of most labor laws and impose sanctions or other 
penalties on employers, courts retain exclusive jurisdiction over some matters 
and have authority to review the actions of the DT. 
1. Wage Claims 
 Under Chilean labor law, the DT may compel parties to attend a 
conciliation hearing regarding wage claims, although it cannot officially 
adjudicate the claims.88  Conciliation has generally not been a jurisdictional 
requirement for wage claims, but the labor laws have recently been amended to 
create a new procedure called the “proceso monitorio,” or monitoring 
procedure, where wage claims regarding the nonpayment of wages totaling ten 
monthly minimum wage salaries or less must first be conciliated by the DT.89  
The worker–plaintiff files a complaint with the DT, which will summon both 
the employer and the worker in an attempt to conciliate the matter.90  The 
parties must take all relevant evidence to that hearing.91  If the matter is not 
settled at conciliation, the DT produces a report that the worker–plaintiff can 
then file in the labor court with his or her complaint, along with the rest of the 
documentary evidence presented at the DT.92  Once filed in court, the judge 
 
 83. Id. arts. 420, 474. 
 84. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 193–94. 
 85. CÓD. TRAB., art. 420(e). 
 86. CONST., art. 20 (Chile). 
 87. CÓD. TRAB., art. 420(e). 
 88. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 193–94. 
 89. CÓD. TRAB, art. 496–97. See also RODOLFO WALTER DÍAZ & GABRIELA LANATA 
FUENZALIDA, REGIMEN LEGAL DEL NUEVO PROCESO LABORAL CHILENO 285–95 (2009). In 
2005, the minimum monthly salary in Chile was 120,000 Chilean pesos a month, or roughly 
about U.S. $221, Oanda.com, http://www.onada.com/convert/fxhistory (last visited Oct. 8, 2009) 
(using the exchange rate of January, 1, 2005). Ten minimum wage monthly salaries, therefore, 
would amount to about US $2210.  For minimum wage rates in Chile in 2005 see Dirección del 
Trabajo, PROYECTO DEBERÁ SER DESPACHADO EN 2 DÍAS POR EL SENADO, SALARIO MÍNIMO 
AUMENTARÁ EN 3.8%, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/article-63791.html. 
 90. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 192. 
 91. CÓD. TRAB., art. 497. 
 92. Id. art. 497. 
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must accept or deny the worker’s complaint based on the merits of the case.93  
Thereafter, any of the parties has ten days to oppose the court’s decision.94  If 
there is no filed opposition to the judge’s resolution within the ten-day period, 
then res judicata prevents the action from being appealed.  If any of the parties 
files a timely opposition, then the judge must schedule a hearing within fifteen 
days of the opposition and thereafter issue a decision.95  The court’s decision 
can be appealed through ordinary appeals procedures available for labor 
matters, except through the procedure of “unificación de jurisprudencia,” or 
unification of jurisprudence, established by article 483 et seq. of the Chilean 
Labor Code.96 
2. Unfair Labor Practices and Violation of Fundamental Rights 
Labor courts also retain exclusive jurisdiction over unfair labor practices in 
Chile.97  Labor inspectors cannot adjudicate unfair labor practices, but they can 
investigate these charges and thereafter file a complaint in the courts if their 
investigation sustains an infraction of law.98  Sanctions in these cases include 
fines99 and “shaming naming,” as the DT must keep a record of employers who 
commit unfair labor practices and publicize it.100  Currently, this list is 
publicized on the DT’s website.101 
The labor courts also have a “tutelary” procedure where individual 
employees and labor unions can seek protection of “fundamental rights”102 that 
are violated at work.103  Fundamental rights include the right to life and 
physical integrity,104 privacy,105 conscience and religion,106 free speech,107 and 
 
 93. Id. art. 499. 
 94. Id. art. 500. 
 95. Id. art. 500–01. 
 96. CÓD. TRAB, art. 502. Unification of jurisprudence joins several cases concerning the 
same legal question or questions, but were decided disparately by the lower courts, so that they 
can be heard and decided collectively by one court of appeals and provide consistency to the 
jurisprudence.  Id. art. 483. 
 97. CÓD. TRAB, art. 420(e). 
 98. Id. art. 292. 
 99. Id. art. 389. 
 100. Id. art. 390. 
 101. GOBIERNO DE CHILE DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO, EMPRESAS Y/O EMPLEADORES (AS) 
CONDENADOS POR PRÁCTICAS ANTISINDICALES SEGUNDO SEMESTRE 2007,  available at 
http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/articles-95482_recurso_1.pdf. 
 102. CÓD. TRAB, Title VII. 
 103. Due to space limitations I have very briefly sketched the tutelary procedure, but for a 
much more in depth description see WALTER DÍAZ & LENATA FUENZALIDA, supra note 89, § 10. 
 104. See CONST. CHILE, art. 19(1). 
 105. See id. arts. 4–5. 
 106. See id. art. 6. 
 107. Id. art. 7. 
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freedom to make employment contracts.108  The courts’ tutelary proceeding 
can also be used to bring sexual harassment complaints.109  Courts have 
exclusive jurisdiction over those complaints. Labor inspectors must file a 
complaint in the court if, as result of their investigation, they take notice of an 
infraction of fundamental rights.110  The DT may also become a party in the 
suit.111  Before filing a complaint in the court, however, the Inspections 
Division of the DT must attempt to mediate the controversy.112  Finally, the 
labor union of the aggrieved worker named in the suit can also join as an 
aggrieved party, either a “tercero coayudante,” third co-helper, or as a primary 
party if it originally filed the complaint in court.113 
3. Labor Justice Reforms 
Labor courts have been in existence in Chile since 1924, with an original 
role to “compensate for economic inferiority with legal superiority.”114  
However, they were not considered to be effective guardians of workers’ rights 
by some commentators and analysts of the court system.115  Perhaps as a result 
of those criticisms the government of Chile reformed its labor courts.  In 2005 
the country enacted a “Labor Justice” reform, which promises rapid, oral, and 
adversarial trials for labor controversies, in contrast to the allegedly slow and 
written proceedings of the past.  It increased the number of labor courts from 
twenty to eighty-four.116  It also seeks to hire almost 500 new functionaries to 
assist the new judges, as well as 137 legal aid lawyers that will represent 
plaintiffs free of charge.117  These new resources and procedures for bringing 
labor law complaints before the courts are intended to speed up labor law 
decisions, from about three years to ninety days.118 
II.  THE UNENFORCEABLE ANTI-SUBCONTRATING LAW 
An important and recent labor law development in Chile has been the anti-
subcontracting law, which limits employers’ use of subcontracting.119  Even 
though Chilean lawmakers gave the DT authority to enforce the new anti-
 
 108. Id. art. 16. 
 109. CÓD. TRAB, art. 485. 
 110. Id. art. 486. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Ietswaart, supra note 32, at 656. 
 115. Id. at 656–58. 
 116. Dirección del Trabajo, Judicatura especializada comenzó a regir en regiones de 
Atacama y Magallanes, available at http://www.dt.gob.cl/1601/printer-95490.html. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. CÓD. TRAB Title VII. 
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subcontracting law, the Chilean appellate-level courts and its Supreme Court 
have determined that any adjudication of contractual matters performed by the 
DT, even under the new law, would violate the constitutional right to not be 
judged by so-called “special commissions” because adjudications of 
contractual controversies reside exclusively within the province of the 
courts.120  These decisions by the Supreme Court of Chile have led the DT to 
clash with the courts, rendering Chile’s labor law enforcement system, at least 
in the eyes of one prominent commentator, “difficult.”121 
A. The Anti-Subcontracting Law 
Labor activists and advocates maintain that subcontracting is currently 
abused by employers.  Since Chilean labor law only protects single-employer 
collective bargaining, subcontracting has become a major tool for employers to 
evade collective bargaining and to be able to hire and fire workers more 
easily.122  Subcontracting blemished the social record of the center-left Chilean 
governments of 1991–2010 that championed the causes of workers as the 
sharpest increases in subcontracting occurred during its tenure.  The mining 
industry, which is mostly state-owned, was one of the industries that expanded 
the use of subcontracting during the years of the Concertación.123  In 1990, 
only about 13% of employees in the mining industry were subcontracted, but 
by 2004 the figure reached 61%.124  In some regions of the country, 
subcontracting has become the employment norm.  For example, in the 
Copaipó agricultural valley, researchers recently estimated that about 95% of 
all employed persons were employed as subcontracted employees.125  
Moreover, the general rate of growth in subcontracting has been significant.  In 
1999, about 32.7% of all Chilean workers employed by general industry were 
subcontracted, and just five years later the figure increased to 43.3%.126 
 
 120. Supreme Court of Chile, Rol. Nos.  877-2008, 953-2008, 1062-2008, 1063-2008, 1073-
2008, 1074-2008, 1075-2008, 1076-2008, 1150-2008, May 12, 2008.  After consulting with 
various members of the Chilean bar, there seems to be no clear definition of what a “special 
commission” is in Chilean jurisprudence.  Rather, “special commissions” have been declared by 
courts ex post, without defining them, and merely seem to mean a body that is not officially a 
court of justice. 
 121. Ugarte Cataldo, supra note 10, at 187. 
 122. DIRECCIÓN DEL TRABAJO Y DEPARTMENTO DE ESTUDIOS El Otro Trabajo: El 
Suministro De Personas En Las Empresas, NO. 7 CUADERNO DE INVESTIGACIÓN 44 (2001); 
Rodrigo Figueroa Valenzuela, Regulación de la subcontratación y el suministro de trabajadores 
en Chile, 16 VEREDAS 129 (2008) (MEXICO).  Dirección del Trabajo, División de Estudios, Los 
Riesgos Laborales de la Subcontratación, 19 APORTE AL DEBATE LABORAL 47 (2006). 
 123. Dirección del Trabajo, División de Estudios, Los Riesgos Laborales de la 
Subcontratación, 19 APORTE AL DEBATE LABORAL 47 (2006). 
 124. Id. 
 125. Figueroa Valenzuela, supra note 122, at 132. 
 126. Dirección del Trabajo, supra note 123, at 52. 
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Subcontracted employees generally suffer worse conditions and terms of 
employment than regular employees.127  Given that only single-employer 
collective bargaining is protected by Chilean law, subcontracted workers 
cannot bargain with the principal.  Subcontracting constrains unionization and 
has become one of the main targets of labor activists and organizations.128  
Labor organizations have every reason to be concerned about their current 
condition and future in Chile.  General labor union density in 2007 stood at a 
mere 11%.129  Having been at 12.4% in 1991,130 union density has diminished 
under the Concertación administrations.131 
To limit subcontracting, the Chilean government approved an anti-
subcontracting law in 2006.132  In addition to forcing temp agencies to register 
with the DT, the law only permits employer–principals to hire workers that are 
going to be under the principal’s control only for specific and “irregular” 
reasons: to substitute a regular employee that is taking a leave of absence; for 
“extraordinary events,” such as organizing a conference; for “new and specific 
projects” including the construction of new facilities or the expansion of 
existing ones; to fill vacancies during the opening days of new enterprises; or 
for “urgent” tasks.133  If employers subcontract employees under the 
principal’s control for other purposes, the law will consider the subcontracted 
workers to be regular employees of the principal and the employees will obtain 
all the rights of regular employees.134  Finally, the law provides the DT with 
the authority to enforce the new law.135  The statute reads: 
The Labor Directorate will enforce compliance with the norms of [the law in 
the] place or places where such services are rendered and in the enterprise 
providing temporary services . . . .136 
 
 127. In the mining industry, for example, the DT has discovered that the average hours 
worked by miners, which are generally excessive—or 2300 hours worked a year—is much higher 
for subcontracted miners, who generally work 2600 hours in one year.  Dirección del Trabajo, 
supra note 123, at 51.  Also, subcontracting hinders unionization and collective bargaining 
because Chilean law does not protect workers’ right to engage in multiemployer collective 
bargaining.  Figueroa Valenzuela, supra note 122, at 133 n.8.  Subcontracting is thus a strategy 
for union busting. 
 128. Figueroa Valenzuela supra note 122, at 132–33. 
 129. División de Estudios: Dirección del Trabajo SERIES ESTADÍSTICAS, Cuadro 1: Cantidad 
de huelgas legales efectuades trabajadores, involucrados, días de duración y costo días-persona, 
a nivel nacional, años 1990 a 2008, at 4 (1990–2008). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. 
 132. CÓD. TRAB, art.183(A–AE). 
 133. Id. art. 183(Ñ). 
 134. Id. art. 183(U). 
 135. Id. art. 183(G). 
 136. Id. (translation by author). 
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B. The Codelco Decisions 
Notwithstanding the new policy against subcontracting abuse, the state-
owned mining company Codelco, nationalized by Salvador Allende in 1971 to 
develop national capital and redistribute the country’s wealth among the 
popular classes, challenged the DT when it imposed fines on Codelco for 
violating the anti-subcontracting law.  The DT determined that Codelco had 
illegally subcontracted about 5000 employees under the anti-subcontracting 
law.137  Codelco claimed, however, and the Supreme Court later affirmed, that 
the DT violated the constitutional rights of the state mining company and its 
subcontractors because the DT did not have the authority to adjudicate 
contractual disputes related to the subcontracting arrangements.138  The 
Supreme Court decided that the DT violated the constitutional rights of 
employers, including the right of persons to be judged by a court rather than 
“special commissions,”139 the right to freely make labor contracts,140 the right 
to engage in legal economic activities,141 and the right to private property.142  
Moreover, the court determined that the DT had exceeded its jurisdiction by 
adjudicating (“calificar”) contractual matters.  Finally, the Supreme Court 
deemed the actions of the DT arbitrary and illegal because the DT did not 
allow the subcontractors to participate in the proceedings which led to its 
determination that Codelco had to absorb the 5000 employees.143 
In a concurring opinion, one justice agreed with the majority’s result, 
reasoning that Codelco had appropriately hired the employees under the anti-
subcontracting law.144  However, the concurring opinion distanced itself from 
the majority by arguing that the DT had the authority to decide whether or not 
an employer was violating the anti-subcontracting law.  According to the 
concurring justice, the DT performed an otherwise legitimate “administrative 
act” when it attempted to determine if Codelco violated the anti-subcontracting 
law; therefore, the DT’s decision did not amount to an unconstitutional act of a 
“special commission.”145  According to the Judge: 
The administrative authority is sanctioned to legally describe the facts, being 
this part of the administrative activity.  Indeed, it is precisely this juridical 
adjudication [calificación jurídica] the one that is indispensable for the 
 
 137. Supreme Court of Chile, Rol No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008. 
 138. Id. 
 139. See CONST., art. 19 §, 3. 
 140. See id. art. 19, § 16. 
 141. See id. art. 19, § 21. 
 142. See id. art. 19, § 24. 
 143. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008. 
 144. A panel of three career justices and one “abogado integrante”—a practicing attorney that 
Chilean law gives authority to participate in the Supreme Court decisions—decided the cases. 
 145. Supreme Court of Chile Rol. No. 887-2008, May 12, 2008, concurring opinion of Judge 
Pierry. 
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exercise of that activity, in particular for the administrative sanction, reason 
why the Labor Inspectorate has not violated article 19 No. 3 . . . of the 
Political Constitution of the Republic by acting as a special commission, 
rather, it has done so in the performance of an administrative activity.146 
Additionally, the concurring opinion stated that the DT was especially justified 
in adjudicating the matter given its lack of standing to take subcontracting 
cases to the courts.147  The concurring judge said that because the Supreme 
Court took away the DT’s authority to adjudicate matters through the 
administrative process, the Supreme Court was effectively making it 
impossible to enforce the anti-subcontracting law except through the 
complaints of individual workers, a remedy he considered “illusory.”148  The 
judge likely found that enforcing the anti-subcontracting law through 
individual complaints would be “illusory” due to classic collective action 
problems associated with large groups of plaintiffs who have individual claims 
worth relatively little compared to the cost of the suit.  Also, workers would 
possibly fear losing their jobs by bringing their claims to the courts as 
individuals. 
After the Codelco decisions were made public, the DT requested that the 
Chilean Congress enact laws providing the DT with standing to represent 
aggrieved workers under the anti-subcontracting law.149  Although some 
lawmakers discussed the matter and agreed to pursue it, to date, the DT has not 
received these powers.  The matter was left to die a slow and almost 
anonymous death.150  The rest of the paper now discusses the policy options to 
 
 146. The Spanish-language original citation reads: 
La autoridad administrativa está facultada para calificar jurídicamente los hechos, siendo 
esto parte de la actividad administrativa. En efecto, es precisamente dicha calificación 
jurídica la que es indispensable para el ejercicio de esa actividad, en particular para la 
sanción administrativa, por lo que al hacerlo la Inspección del Trabajo  no ha vulnerado lo 
dispuesto en el artículo 19 N° 3 inciso 4° de la Constitución Política de la República 
actuando como comisión especial, sino que lo ha hecho en el desempeño de una actividad 
administrativa. 
Supreme Court of Chile, Rol No. 887-2008 (emphasis added in English translation). 
 147. Id. 
 148. Id. 
 149. G. Orellana et al., Justicia da duro golpe a la Dirección del Trabajo y revierte 
dictámenes contra Codelco, EL MERCURIO, May 13, 2008 at B2.  A. Chaparro & C. Palma; 
Directora del Trabajo: “Hubo Cierta Disparidad de Criterio’s,” LA NACIÓN,  May 13, 2008, at 
10, available at http://www.lanacion.cl/prontus_noticias_v2/site/artic/20080512/pags/200805122 
05003.html; H. Cisternas,  P. Obregón y L. Castañeda, MINISTROS PÉREZ YOMA Y ANDRADE 
REBATEN A CUEVAS Y DICEN QUE CODELCO CUMPLE ACUERDOS, EL MERCURIO, May 14, 2008, 
at B2; H. Cisternas, P. Obregón y L. Castañeda, La Corte Suprema Dictaría Precedente: 
Expertos: fallo apunta a excesos históricos del ente fiscalizador, EL MERCURIO, May 14, 2008, at 
B2. 
 150. César F. Rosado Marzán, fieldnotes of December 18, 2009 (on file with author). 
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enforce the anti-subcontracting law after these events and legal decisions, 
including the DT’s request to obtain standing to file complaints in the labor 
courts under the anti-subcontracting law. 
IV.  SOME POLICY CHOICES 
Chile confronts not only internal difficulties in enforcing its domestic labor 
laws, particularly its anti-subcontracting law, but also cannot meet its 
commitments under the labor clause of the U.S.-Chile FTA.  Reforms are 
required.  To help, labor and human rights activists could pressure the United 
States government to start a process of consultations under the U.S.-Chile FTA 
to seek enforcement of the anti-subcontracting law.  The United States could 
resolve this stalemate by pursuing a two-pronged approach to make the anti-
subcontracting law enforceable: (1) Extend the scope of pedagogical labor 
inspections in Chile, and (2) provide standing to the DT, as its Director 
requested after the Codelco decisions in 2008, so that it can file complaints in 
the labor courts under the anti-subcontracting law. 
A. Extending Pedagogical Inspections 
Perhaps the one policy option which would likely face less opposition from 
Chilean employers and the right-wing is the expansion of the DT’s pedagogical 
inspections.  Pedagogical inspections stress compliance assistance rather than 
punitive fines and strive to obtain voluntary compliance with labor laws 
through eventual “self-regulation.”151  Scholars have maintained that 
pedagogical inspections historically aided some countries in implementing 
their labor laws in a manner that promotes organizational innovation at the 
workplace while safeguarding comparative advantage and social stability.152  
Chile should not shy away from extending these programs. 
Already, Chile has instituted at least two programs with pedagogical 
elements.153  One, the “training-for-fines” program, has been heralded as a 
success by many sectors because it provides smaller employers with some 
needed wherewithal to comply with the labor laws.154  Extending the program 
to larger employers, such as Codelco, could better facilitate understanding of 
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the labor laws among managers and facilitate ways to implement the law 
efficiently. 
Another program with pedagogical elements is the compliance-assistance 
inspections policy, which is implemented mainly at organized workplaces 
where labor unions can serve as a monitoring body.155  But since most 
employers have no unionized employees, compliance assistance remains a very 
limited inspection policy in Chile.156 
To increase the scope and breadth of pedagogical inspections, Chilean 
labor inspectors need to think of themselves as more than a mere police force 
and act, at least at times, as human resource consultants and innovators of 
production processes.  This is particularly important to implement in Chile 
since its compliance orientation is primarily punitive, leading to conflicts with 
employers, which result in litigation where the DT is ultimately reprimanded 
and its authority formally limited.  Here, Chile’s enforcement orientation 
policy contrasts with that of its much poorer cousin, the Dominican Republic, 
which, even though it generally lacks quality state institutions, has recently 
overhauled its inspection service to persuade employers that labor law 
compliance is not only a legal requirement, but also good for business, in the 
mold of the traditional French model.157  As sociologist Andrew Schrank 
asserts for the Dominican Republic: 
While scofflaw employers frequently assert an inability to comply with the law 
and remain profitable, professional inspectors respond—at least occasionally—
by pointing to their compliant neighbors and their organizational differences: 
What differentiates the compliant firms from their non-compliant neighbors?  
They train their managers.  They use modular production . . . .  They pursue 
vertical integration.  And they sometimes diversify . . . into more remunerative 
activities.  By distributing information on training and best practices . . . the 
inspectors overcome an important market imperfection and thereby make 
compliance good for business.158 
Professional labor inspectors should provide a service to employers that 
helps them innovate and establish best practices.  In the United States, firms 
purchase such advice from human resource management professionals.159  In 
Franco-Hispanic jurisdictions, labor inspectors serve a similar role when they 
are properly trained and provided with the appropriate resources.160  Such a 
service, provided as a public good to employers, can prove invaluable for the 
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Chilean economy.  It could also prove crucial for the enforcement of Chilean 
labor law. 
Pedagogical inspections require a highly professionalized labor 
inspectorate, which may be difficult to create in cash-strapped developing 
economies.  But Chile could at least promote further professionalization of its 
existing inspectorate by providing its new inspection school (which opened in 
2009) with resources to develop inspection professionals that view themselves 
as more than a labor police.161  Targeted courses and specific resources aimed 
at teaching inspectors about developing best practices from their field 
inspections and then disseminating those best practices to other workplaces 
could go a long way towards creating a different compliance culture in Chile. 
The United States also could play a useful role in the professionalization of 
the labor inspectorate of Chile through cooperative consultations under the 
FTA.  While it has been argued that the United States has followed a more 
“punitive” model of labor law enforcement common to Anglo-American 
jurisdictions,162 with little resemblance to the Franco-Hispanic model, this does 
not mean that the United States lacks professionals experienced in instructing 
employers on compliance with labor laws and cementing cultures of labor law 
compliance.  Because the United States federal government has been 
“administratively weak,” it has depended on civil society, namely human 
resource management professionals, to instruct employers on how to comply 
with the country’s labor laws and protect themselves against expensive 
lawsuits.163  United States labor and employment attorneys representing 
management have developed sophisticated practices to “bullet proof” 
employers from liability arising from labor and employment law violations and 
have disseminated these prophylactic practices to other countries.164  While 
cooperative consultations between Chile and the United States must be 
sensitive to particular types of labor law violations, industries, employer types, 
institutional contexts, and substantive legal differences between both countries, 
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there can be fruitful exchanges between Chilean labor law enforcement 
agents—namely, the labor inspectorate—and American professionals who 
specialize in instructing employers regarding means to compliance with labor 
and employment laws.  Experimenting with these consultations may prove to 
be an innovative strategy for cross-border labor diplomacy under the U.S.-
Chile FTA.165 
B. Granting Standing to the DT 
In addition to the promise of self-regulatory strategies oriented by 
pedagogical inspection programs, Chile also realistically needs to threaten 
violators of labor laws with punitive sanctions when persuasion proves 
insufficient, especially since the DT was substantially weakened by the 
Codelco decisions. 
Recent social science literature has shown that purely self-regulatory 
strategies are insufficient to compel employers to comply with the labor 
laws.166  State-backed punitive sanctions for insistent, lawbreaking employers 
are needed.167  The DT, therefore, was correct to request that the Chilean 
legislature allow it standing to sue on behalf of aggrieved workers under the 
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anti-subcontracting law.168  The request likely was controversial because the 
political right-wing has opposed extending the DT’s powers.169  Political 
opposition against providing the DT with standing to bring claims under the 
anti-subcontracting law, however, could be blunted by packaging that reform 
with one that would extend both pedagogical inspections and a model of 
voluntary compliance in the country. 
V.  CONCLUSION: FROM STORM TROOPERS TO LABOR INSPECTORS AND 
JUDGES 
Enforcing the anti-subcontracting law matters deeply because it goes to the 
heart of a history full of broken promises.  Chilean working-class history is 
riddled with events where workers struggle to defend their rights, only to either 
face brutal repression or indifference from the state.  As an example, in April 
of 1971, more than 1500 workers at the largest textile mill in Chile took over 
the mill in response to unaddressed, decades-old workplace grievances, 
including wage theft and refusal to recognize their union.170  The workers 
seized the mill from the owner after Salvador Allende, the Socialist 
Compañero Presidente of the Unidad Popular political coalition, won the 
elections and gave the workers confidence to create a new future for 
themselves.171  According to historian Peter Winn, the takeover of the large 
textile mill symbolically marked the country’s official “road to socialism,” as it 
showed workers’ willingness to participate as active members of the political 
process.172 
Before the textile workers took over the mill, they had depended for 
decades on “ill-paid” and “venal” labor inspectors who “turned a blind eye to 
[the employer’s] violations of the labor laws and repression of union 
democracy. . . .”173  With the triumph of Allende and Unidad Popular in 1970, 
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those textile workers, along with millions of other Chileans, felt that the 
government was finally responsive to their material and moral needs.174  
Workers not only took to the streets and seized some plants, but also filed 
charges with the DT in pursuit of workplace justice.175 
Working-class mobilizations at the street, workplace, and bureaucratic 
levels suffered a huge setback with the 1973 military coup, which occurred 
with the acquiescence, if not direct support, of the United States.176  The 
military coup, led by General Augusto Pinochet, quickly dissolved working 
class organizations and dismantled state institutions that served workers’ 
interests.  Several years after the coup, the Pinochet dictatorship started an 
aggressive neoliberal political project with the aid of the so-called “Chicago 
Boys.”177 
However, even the military dictatorship could not completely crush 
Chilean workers’ resilience and combativeness for a more democratic 
society.178  Indeed, miners became the backbone of the organized opposition to 
the dictatorship, many times leading heroic labor strikes and other concerted 
actions that defied the regime’s brutal repression.179  In 1991, almost twenty 
years after the coup, democracy was restored in Chile, but not until after scores 
of ordinary workers had been pauperized, harassed, arrested, tortured, and 
killed.180  By the 1990s, similar to 1970, Chilean workers expected dramatic 
change.  Even after significant reconstruction of the DT, change with tangible 
results for the working class has been slow to materialize.181  So the miners 
continued to strive for labor rights.  In 2006, more than 28,000 subcontracted 
miners led a massive demonstration in Santiago demanding the same benefits 
as regular employees.182  The DT’s subsequent actions against Codelco for 
violating the anti-subcontracting law were likely motivated by this national 
mobilization of subcontracted miners.  However, two years later, the Supreme 
Court of Chile stopped the DT’s attempts to compel Codelco, a government-
owned and run institution, to abide by the anti-subcontracting law, making the 
statute effectively unenforceable.  In this manner, Chile’s labor law is starting 
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become a mere “aspirational” law, such as is the ill-reputed Mexican labor 
laws, for example, where the laws “on the books” clash with reality.  I cannot 
imagine that proudly-legalistic Chile wants to develop such a lackluster 
reputation regarding its legal institutions. 
Despite the recent developments in Chilean labor law, there are reasons to 
be optimistic.  First, Chile seems to be part of the general trend in Latin 
America to break away from violent resolution of industrial conflict.  In the 
past, the capitalist class of Chile, as in other Latin American countries, counted 
on bayonet-wielding storm troopers to resolve workplace disputes.  Today, the 
same capitalist class counts on conservative appellate-level courts to protect 
their private property rights.  While labor advocates may still see these courts 
as adversaries, conservative courts are an improvement over state-backed 
violence.  To paraphrase sociologist Andrew Schrank, Latin American 
governments used to resolve “industrial conflict by hiring death squads; today, 
they pursue a similar goal by hiring lawyers and labor inspectors.”183  
Lawyers—including judges—and inspectors may not be always adequate, but 
“their mere existence constitutes progress of a sort and provides a block on 
which to build in the rest of the century.”184  Second, the United States, rather 
than instigating right-wing coups to crush working-class movements and leftist 
governments in Latin America, as it did during the Cold War, can enforce 
labor rights through the FTAs.185  In Chile, it can provide technical knowledge 
to improve Chilean justice and help Chile enforce its anti-subcontracting law.  
It can also legitimately throw its weight behind such an initiative.  This is 
certainly an improvement over the past.  However, laws, norms, and 
agreements are never self-executing.  We need to put our efforts and energies 
into materializing the possibilities that the new national laws and transnational 
norms and agreements provide.  The path may seem difficult, but there is a 
path, nevertheless. 
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